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INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-year history of Fordham Law School’s annual 
Intellectual Property Conference spans a major reorientation of 
U.S. competition policy concerning technologically dynamic 
industries and intellectual property rights.  This Article uses the 
twentieth anniversary of the Fordham Conference to describe five 
developments that have altered the relationship between the policy 
domains of antitrust and intellectual property.  The article also uses 
 
  Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University 
Law School.  From January 2006 to October 2011, Professor Kovacic served as a 
member of the Federal Trade Commission.   He chaired the agency from March 2008 to 
March 2009. 
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experience since the early 1990s to suggest what is to come in 
years ahead. 
I. THE SHRINKING ZONE OF POTENTIAL SHERMAN ACT AND 
CLAYTON ACT LIABILITY 
Firms face fewer risks of prosecution and liability today than 
they did two decades ago under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act 
for the exploitation of intellectual property rights.  Two 
developments account for this condition.  The first is that 
government policy has continued its retreat, begun in the 1980s, 
from a longstanding tradition of suspicion toward intellectual 
property rights.1  In 1995 and again in 2007, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued 
policy documents that disavowed reliance on expansive theories of 
enforcement and acknowledged the benefits of intellectual 
property protection for innovation and economic growth.  Both the 
words and the “music” of these documents provided assurance to 
firms and to the IP community that the antitrust system was not 
incorrigibly hostile to patents and other forms of intellectual 
property rights. 
When government agencies or private plaintiffs have filed 
antitrust cases involving the application of IP rights, they have 
found the path to success more difficult than they did twenty years 
ago.  In a number of respects, the U.S. jurisprudence has unfolded 
in ways that can be considered more sympathetic to the interests of 
rights holders.  In some matters, the courts have backed away from 
earlier interpretations that treated the possession of a patent, 
copyright, or trademark as presumptive proof of substantial market 
power.2  In others the courts generally have rejected efforts by 
public and private plaintiffs to challenge “reverse payments” 
between branded pharmaceutical producers and generic entrants as 
 
 1 See 2 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
1049–50 (7th ed. 2012) (describing antagonism toward IP rights expressed in judicial 
decisions and federal enforcement policy from the 1930s through the 1970s).  
 2 See Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006) (rejecting 
presumption that intellectual property rights automatically confer monopoly power on 
their owners). 
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illegal restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
Three federal circuits have ruled that patent infringement 
settlements that provide for delayed entry by the generic entrant 
ordinarily are not illegal trade restraints and constitute violations 
only in limited circumstances.3  Owing to a circuit split highlighted 
by a recent decision of the Third Circuit,4 the Supreme Court has 
accepted certiorari to address the issue in an FTC case decided by 
the Eleventh Circuit.5 
Amid trends toward relatively greater doctrinal permissiveness, 
plaintiffs have enjoyed some litigation success at the intersection 
of antitrust and intellectual property policy.  Perhaps the most 
interesting developments have involved single-firm conduct.  
Matters involving Microsoft and Google provide bookends for the 
period covered by the Fordham IP Conference.  The first 
conference took place during deliberations within the FTC about 
whether to bring an antitrust case against Microsoft.  Fordham 
convened the twentieth conference in 2012 as the FTC investigated 
claims of anticompetitive conduct by Google. 
The overall trend of antitrust doctrine involving improper 
exclusion by dominant firms has favored greater freedom for 
companies to choose pricing, product design, and distribution 
strategies.  Against a backdrop of less-intervention-friendly 
doctrine, the DOJ nonetheless achieved an important doctrinal 
victory against Microsoft.  The government alleged that the 
software producer improperly used a variety of tactics (including 
exclusive dealing agreements with original equipment 
manufacturers and Internet service operators and tying 
arrangements) to forestall Netscape and Java from functioning as a 
less expensive alternative to its own product.  The district court 
found liability and ordered the company’s divestiture into two 
 
 3 See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 4 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 5 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).  The Court has scheduled oral argument in this 
matter for late March.  After the beginning of litigation, Watson Pharmaceuticals took the 
name Activis.  Accordingly, the case is now called Federal Trade Commission v. Activis. 
C10_KOVACIC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:41 PM 
648 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:645 
firms, one that would make operating systems and a second that 
would produce applications.6 
A unanimous court of appeals upheld the finding of liability, 
albeit on more limited grounds.7  The court remanded some issues 
for reconsideration by the district court and cautioned that the 
choice of remedy must account for the narrowing of the basis of 
liability.  In doing so, the D.C. Circuit brushed aside Microsoft’s 
arguments that its IP rights entitled it to engage in the challenged 
conduct.8  Within months of the court of appeals decision, the 
DOJ, various state attorneys general, and Microsoft settled the case 
with conduct remedies that inspired bitter debate.  Advocates of 
more expansive relief accused the DOJ of a politically motivated 
capitulation to Microsoft.  The DOJ responded that demands for a 
broader remedy ignored the admonition from the court of appeals 
to tailor the remedy to fit the more modest grounds of liability. 
After contentious proceedings, the district court approved the 
settlement, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
The Microsoft merits decision represented what many regard to 
be an important advance in antitrust doctrine, especially in creating 
a burden shifting framework for evaluating allegations of 
exclusion.9  The district judge’s management of the case also 
demonstrated that a court could try complex claims of single-firm 
misconduct in a relatively short time—a key consideration in 
deciding whether antitrust law is a suitable means to oversee 
behavior in technologically dynamic sectors.  At the same time, the 
settlement achieved in the case left a sour taste in the mouths of 
commentators who expected a considerably greater remedial return 
for the favorable result on liability. 
The election of Barack Obama as President in 2008 seemed to 
foreshadow a significant expansion of DOJ efforts to bring single-
firm conduct cases.  During the presidency of George W. Bush, the 
DOJ initiated no Sherman Act section 2 cases.  In 2008 DOJ also 
issued a report on single-firm conduct that endorsed analytical 
 
 6 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 7 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  
 8 See id. at 62–63. 
 9 See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 654–57 (2d ed. 2008). 
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standards that disfavored prosecution except in exceptional 
circumstances.  Soon after her appointment, Christine Varney, 
President Obama’s first choice to head the Antitrust Division, 
repudiated the DOJ section 2 report and appeared to indicate that 
expanded section 2 enforcement would be a significant DOJ 
priority.  Since January 2009, DOJ has issued one single-firm 
exclusion case, a settlement involving a hospital’s use of exclusive 
dealing arrangements to deter entry in Wichita Falls, Texas. 
Nor has the low DOJ yield of Section 2 cases resulted from a 
want of effort.  The DOJ has undertaken investigations, but found 
no additional suitable candidates.  In recent months, the Antitrust 
Division closed the file on a long-running inquiry involving 
Monsanto and its use of patents to suppress rivalry in various 
agricultural products markets.  External observers had speculated 
that the Monsanto investigation would lead to a major case 
involving Section 2 and the use of IP rights.  The DOJ stood down, 
perhaps in recognition of difficulties imposed by the intervention 
skepticism embedded in modern Supreme Court decisions such as 
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
L.L.P.10  Despite an evident inclination to pursue a larger number 
of single-firm conduct matters, the Obama Antitrust Division 
leadership seems to have concluded that successful cases of this 
type must run a particularly difficult doctrinal gauntlet. 
II. ATTEMPTS TO APPLY SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT 
As suggested earlier, the FTC has devoted extensive resources 
to attack reverse payment agreements between manufacturers of 
branded pharmaceuticals and generic entrants.  These initiatives, 
which have relied on Sherman Act theories of liability, have not 
been the sole FTC litigation activities involving antitrust and 
intellectual property.  The Commission has used section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of 
competition (UMC), to obtain a settlement with Intel to resolve 
allegations of improper exclusionary conduct, to investigate 
 
 10 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
C10_KOVACIC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:41 PM 
650 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:645 
Google’s practices involving search, and to obtain settlements 
concerning efforts by Google and Robert Bosch to seek injunctions 
to enforce standard essential patents subject to commitments to 
license such patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
terms. 
Congress intended the Commission to use its section 5 UMC 
authority to set business conduct norms more demanding than 
those established by judicial interpretations of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts.  In theory, the courts have recognized the FTC’s 
authority to perform this norms-creation function.  In practice, 
modern judicial decisions have tended to reject Commission efforts 
to use section 5’s elastic power to move the perimeter of liability 
outwards.  The Commission has not prevailed in a litigated matter 
premised solely on section 5 (i.e., with no reliance on Sherman or 
Clayton Act principles) since the late 1960s.  The volume of 
defeats in the past forty-plus years is not immense (three adverse 
decisions in the court of appeals, and one loss in federal district 
court), but the setbacks collectively reflect skepticism about the 
agency’s assessment of the conduct at issue and, one infers, its 
capacity to define meaningful standards for the application of its 
special authority. 
The FTC’s accomplishments with section 5, including its 
initiatives involving IP rights, have consisted entirely of 
settlements.  These include settlements with Negotiated Data 
Solutions and Intel concerning improper exclusion, and settlements 
with Google and Bosch involving standard essential patents 
(SEPs).  The Commission closed its investigation of Google’s 
search practices without taking action, save for Google’s written 
assurances of voluntary compliance with commitments to modify 
some elements of its conduct.  From the somewhat 
incomprehensible Commission statement closing the case, it 
appears that Google refused to accept an order (the FTC’s routine 
method of settling disputes with undertakings from respondents) 
and told the agency that, if the FTC wished to use section 5 or any 
other theory to obtain concessions, the Commission would have to 
gain them through adjudication. 
As noted earlier, the SEP settlements involving Google and 
Bosch both rely on section 5.  The form in which the Commission 
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announced these settlements was unconventional.  Regarding 
Bosch, the FTC accepted the SEP settlement in tandem with an 
announcement that the company had agreed to divestitures and 
other relief to obtain clearance of a proposed merger.  The 
Commission said it had discovered the SEP issues in the course of 
conducting the merger review, and it sought to resolve the merger 
and nonmerger questions as a package.  One way to interpret the 
Bosch settlement is to conclude that the FTC used the leverage 
inherent in its gatekeeping function in the U.S. premerger 
notification regime to obtain concessions on issues unrelated to the 
merger itself.  Because section 5 provided the basis for the Bosch 
settlement, the matter raises the possibility that parties whose 
mergers are reviewed by the FTC will face a greater likelihood of 
intervention than they would in a merger review by the DOJ.  In an 
FTC review, the Commission may find collateral issues that it 
chooses to pursue under section 5 and may press for resolution of 
those issues in conjunction with the merger review.  Because 
section 5’s reach is broader than the Sherman or Clayton Acts, the 
possibility for intervention expands when the FTC is reviewing the 
merger. 
III. EMPHASIS ON NON-LITIGATION POLICY TOOLS 
The enforcement activities described above continue to provide 
the core of activity by the federal antitrust agencies concerning 
intellectual property.  Since the early 1990s, however, there has 
been a marked orientation of policy toward non-litigation 
initiatives.  In the past two decades, the U.S. enforcement agencies 
have adopted a broader, multidisciplinary perspective and applied 
a broader range of policy tools to address questions that arise at the 
intersection of the antitrust and intellectual property systems.  The 
FTC took a large step in this direction in the mid-1990s by 
convening hearings on competition policy and innovation in the 
global economy.  In 2002, the DOJ, the FTC, and the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) held hearings on competition policy 
and the patent system. 
The 2002 proceedings resulted in a formative FTC report, To 
Promote Innovation.  The Commission followed this report a 
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decade later with an extensive study of remedies in the patent 
system.  As a further element of advocacy, the FTC recently filed a 
letter with the Court of International Trade to caution against the 
issuance of exclusion orders in certain cases.  The DOJ and the 
PTO later filed a joint statement on the application of injunctive 
relief and the use of exclusion orders. 
All of these initiatives recognize that problems often observed 
in the competition policy realm have their roots in the intellectual 
property rights-granting process.  First-best solutions to 
competition problems would consist of improvements in the rights-
granting process.  The prosecution of antitrust cases—for example, 
the application of monopolization concepts to expand access to IP 
rights—may be a crude, second-best solution to cure weaknesses 
that reside in the rights granting process. 
 
IV. ASCENT OF EUROPE AS CENTER OF ANTITRUST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The European Union has not encountered the limitations faced 
by the U.S. antitrust agencies in using its law enforcement powers 
to address claims of exclusion involving intellectual property.  EU 
doctrine governing abuse of dominance sets more stringent limits 
upon companies than prevailing judicial interpretations of the 
Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.  In Microsoft and Intel, the 
European Commission obtained remedies notably more substantial 
than DOJ or the FTC attained in their cases, respectively.  In 
Google, the European Commission seems poised to gain 
concessions related to search practices that emerged from the 
FTC’s inquiry unscathed. 
The disparate results in the EU and the United States highlight 
the ascent of the EU competition law system to global preeminence 
in setting standards for single-firm conduct.  The Google inquiries 
underscore this difference most starkly.  Commentators have 
questioned the fortitude of the Bush administration antitrust 
agencies to prosecute instances of single-firm conduct.  None have 
doubted the commitment of the Obama antitrust prosecutors.  Yet, 
for all of its efforts, the Obama FTC leadership could not produce 
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a case involving Google search, nor could they obtain settlement 
concessions.  If there were any question about the difference in the 
EU and United States doctrine and enforcement possibilities, 
Google resolved them. 
V. CHANGE IN COMPETITION LAW PRACTICE 
Since the early 1990s, we have witnessed another noteworthy 
change in the nature of competition law practice that goes beyond 
shifts in legal doctrine, enforcement policy, and reliance on non-
litigation policy instruments.  The strategy of companies and their 
external advisors in dealing with the regulatory state has changed 
significantly, as well.  In its dealings with the FTC and then with 
DOJ in the 1990s, Microsoft was slow to build an extensive 
presence in Washington, D.C.  Like many high-tech firms, 
Microsoft may have regarded the nation’s capital as an alien and 
unimportant realm, unconnected with the urgent business of 
devising and producing new products. 
Microsoft’s experience changed all of that.  Its opponents 
mobilized Washington-related resources more effectively and 
gained an advantage as a result.  They opened larger Washington 
representation offices, hired more lobbyists, engaged more public 
relation specialists, and employed more media consultants.  Google 
seems to have learned from Microsoft’s experience, and it 
mobilized considerably greater resources in Washington to handle 
the FTC inquiry.  It built a substantial Washington office and 
retained a large body of external advisors.  It also enlisted the 
assistance of a large network of commentators and scholars to 
speak on its behalf.  This helped mute opposition to the FTC’s 
decision to end its case. 
Google and other high technology companies have adopted an 
additional practice as a precaution against antitrust intervention 
and other regulatory measures.  Rather than wait for an inquiry to 
being, companies now send officials to Washington more regularly 
for get-acquainted visits to agency leaders and to give briefings on 
new product development or policy initiatives.  These measures 
perform what might be called a framing function (to set a favorable 
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image of the company) and a de-biasing function (to identify and 
defuse possible concerns about the company’s conduct). 
 
 
